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This paper analyses a signalling model of managers' promotion 
from divisions to the CEO position, in both cases of a monopoly 
and a duopoly. Explicit and implicit incentives in the presence of 
asymmetric information are shown to induce managers to increase 
effort in order to signal high ability to owners, thereby raising their 
probability of promotion. Firms' performance in duopoly is shown 
to depend on their internal organisation, through owners" choice of 
incentives, in addition to demand and technology conditions.
JEL Codes: D82. .133. L13. L21
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This paper analyses managers incentives and derives consequences of owner- 
manager interactions for competition in oligopolistic markets. The major 
aim is to show that the effect of competition on market structure is ambigu­
ous, depending critically on internal organisation and information flows 
within the firm. The focus is on promotion prospects in the firm’s internal 
labour market.
Implicit incentives (reputation effects of promotion) have been shown to 
be important in the context of managers’ compensation by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990). They show that managers’ motivation does not stem 
primarily from direct compensation. This paper uses a signalling model1 
that captures an important feature of the reputation effects that is not 
analysed in previous work. An attempt is therefore made at formalising 
career concerns in internal labour markets, unlike existing literature which 
focuses on external labour markets. In this paper, signalling aspects of 
incentives are shown in the context of exogenous wages, and screening 
aspects are outlined by endogenising wages. This endogenisation of wages 
further enables me to provide a new explanation for the profit and sales 
maximisation objective of Vickers (1985).
Attempts to bring agency theory into oligopoly models are very recent and 
few. Thus Gal-Or (1993, p. 157) claims that “the relationship between 
competition in the product market and managerial compensation has been 
entirely overlooked” . Vickers (1985) sets the agenda for the issue of strate­
gic delegation in his 1985 paper “Delegation and the Theory of the Firm” , 
where he shows that the delegation of decisions to a manager may have 
strategic advantages to the benefits of the owner. He illustrates his point 
by assuming an oligopoly in which all firms but one are profit maximisers. 
The remaining firm has management separate from ownership, where the 
owner has to set a compensation to managers for his interest (profit max­
imisation) to be served. This compensation is assumed to be a weighted 
sum of profits and sales, reflecting the claim in the literature2 that man­
agers may have a preference for sales. The firm that does not maximise 
profits directly is shown to be able to increase output at the expense of
1 Inspired by the model of limit pricing of Milgrom and Roberts (1982).



























































































rivals, hence to earn larger profits than profit-maxiinisers (in Cournot com­
petition, where strategic variables are substitutes hence reaction functions 
are downward-sloping).
Later, Fershtmann and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), extend Vickers' 
point to study the effect on the weight of the objective function imposed 
on managers, of the type of competition or of uncertainty on demand 
and cost parameters in duopolies. Both find that it is more profitable to 
set greater weight to sales maximisation in Cournot competition with a 
homogenous good, whereas managers are overcompensated for profits in 
Bertrand competition with differentiated products. However, both papers 
avoid issues of asymmetry of information between owners and managers, 
and take compensation schemes as given rather than discussing the choice 
of optimal contract by the owner. This paper addresses this issue. The 
idea is to show that the weight on profit is just a result of managers’ cost 
minimising activities. Once this point is made, I analyse how the owner 
can set incentives that induce managers to work more or less hard, which 
implies greater or smaller reductions in cost.
More recent papers introduce the issue of information asymmetry, in par­
ticular the uncertainty as to managers’ ability yielding adverse selection 
problems. Thus Harrington and Senbongi (1995) consider a Cournot duopoly 
with homogenous good. Their novelty is to introduce adverse selection 
problems, as well as labour market constraints. Thus managers’ income 
is the sum of their current income in the firm and their future income as 
valued on the managerial labour market. Therefore the paper includes the 
interesting feature of managers’ reputation. The labour market assesses a 
manager’s ability according to his realised performance. Hence managers 
have some incentive to signal high ability through high performance, in or­
der to build a reputation for ability on the labour market. Compensation 
set by the owner is exogenous, assumed to be a function of gross profits. 
Senbongi and Harrington confirm that the consequence of the introduc­
tion of owner-manager agency problems in oligopolies is an intensification 
of competition.
Gal-Or (1993) formalises an interesting model of the interactions between 
internal organisation and market performance in oligopolies. She assumes 
both moral hazard and adverse selection, in that the owner observes neither 




























































































ated product. She assumes that the owner hires managers to supervise two 
functions, production and distribution. These activities can be done by one 
single manager, in which case the firm is specialised, or by two different 
managers, in which case the firm is departmentalised. A three-stage game 
is considered, where the owner decides on the internal organisation in the 
first stage (choosing either one or two managers), sets compensation in the 
second stage (as a function of observables only, namely sales volume and 
production cost). In the final stage, each sales manager observes demand 
and reports it to the owner. Her main results are that the firm’s choice of 
internal organisation affects its strategic position and that compensation 
schemes depend on the extent of competition in the product market as 
well as on the internal organisation of the two firms through the degree of 
correlation between the uncertain demand schedules that they are facing.
However Gal-Or does not discuss alternative incentive contracts, but just 
assumes one form of contract. Harrington and Senbongi justify this draw­
back by saying that “at this early stage of trying to understand the inter­
action between agency theory and oligopoly theory” , it is “best to have 
a minimum number of effects at play so as not to confound the analysis” 
(p98). It is true that the formalisation of agency models usually involves 
many parameters and complicated computations, which become easily un- 
tractable when added to oligopoly formalisation. However the important 
next step in the analysis of the above mentioned interactions is to examine 
more closely the determination of managers’ rewards in light of both the 
agency problem and strategic competition in oligopolies. Martin (1993) 
makes this step forward by considering a Cournot principal agent model 
of the determinants of firm efficiency. Each firm in the oligopoly has a 
manager and an owner, the latter setting a cost target and fee schedule 
that induces the manager to choose the proper action and maximises the 
owner’s expected profit. The main result is that the degree of firm effi­
ciency is inversely related to the number of firms in the market, which 
contradicts previous findings of Leibenstein and his “x-inefficiency” the­
ory. This shows that oligopoly theory is enriched by considering factors of 




























































































2 Modelling implicit incentives
In this paper I model signalling features of implicit incentives which, given 
wages, induce managers to increase effort. Their ability is unknown to 
the owner who only observes output x. which is given by x  =  a + e. a is 
manager’s ability, is given to them by nature and is either high ( / / )  or low 
(L). e is effort which can take any positive value whatever the type H or 
L. The owner cannot observe e or a and therefore managers have to signal 
their ability to the owner in order to be considered for promotion.
Implicit incentives are incentives resulting from managers’ career concerns 
rather than from wages. Career concerns occur in the presence of asym­
metric information about managers ability, so that the labour market or 
employers have to use the observation of past and current output to update 
their beliefs about ability and then base future wages on these updated be­
liefs. Ability being unobservable, managers have to build a reputation for 
ability in order to either be promoted inside the firm (in the internal labour 
market), or to receive offers from other employers on the labour market (in 
the - usually competitive - external labour market), and thus obtain wage 
increases. This improvement of labour markets’ or employers’ perception 
of managers productivity is defined by Vickers and Meyer (1995) as a repu­
tation effect and is an implicit incentive. Alternatively, the owner uses the 
compensation scheme to screen higher ability managers. Screening models 
are in fact signalling models, but are called screening because then the 
major role is that of the owner who decides on the contract in order that 
ability be revealed. This paper considers first an exogenous wage, so that 
the model is first purely signalling, and then endogenises wages, thereby 
taking a screening nature as termed in the literature.
Issues of promotion and career concern have been studied in the recent 
literature, with three main theories of promotion emerging. The first the­
ory views promotions as a learning device. For instance, Holmstrom and 
Ricart i Costa (1986) develop a model based on learning about managerial 
talent in order to show how career concerns rather than effort aversion in­
duces managers to follow the owners interests. The owners uses managers’ 
performance as indicator of talent. Managers’ decisions have two returns, 
one on the firm’s value, and the other on the value of the managers’ human 




























































































the owner to induce managers to care about both values, and centralised 
capital budgeting is shown to be a way to do this. However, as the rela­
tionship unfolds over time, ability becomes known to both the owner and 
the labour market. Hence the owner has to reward managers in order for 
them not to be bid away from the firm.
Another theory of promotion is that of rank-order tournaments. Thus 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) view salaries as prizes of promotion lotteries and 
grades as names for prizes. Besides, the model of Macleod and Malcomson 
(1988) is an interesting model of ability and adverse selection, where it is 
assumed that workers’ ability is private information. Because performance 
measures are not verifiable, self-enforcing contracts are of the termination 
type: if the performance of a worker is not satisfactory, he is dismissed. 
Macleod and Malcomson show that the equilibrium rank hierarchy has a 
finite number of pay grades, despite a continuum of possible ability levels.
These models either assume imperfect or private information on managers’ 
ability. In the case of imperfect information, ability is initially unknown to 
the owner but then revealed over time as the game unfolds. This the case 
of the model of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), who extend the Fama (1980) 
and Holmstrom (1982) modelling of incentive contracts to show the im­
plications of changes in implicit incentives (from career concerns) over the 
course of a manager’s career for optimal explicit incentives (wages). In this 
paper ability is assumed to be private information. Managers know their 
ability, the owner cannot learn it perfectly and since promotion is prof­
itable for managers they try to signal their ability in order to be included 
in the pool of candidates for promotion.
3 Signalling Model in a monopoly
3.1 Model
Consider a simple two-period model of a single corporation with N  divi­
sions, in the M-forin of organisation. The role of the CEO is to advise, audit 
and allocate resources between divisions. The more efficient is a CEO. the 
more each division’s unit cost is reduced. It is assumed that each CEO 



























































































schedule W\ and w2. In this section, wages are exogenous in the sense 
that the way the owner computes these wages is not formalised. Managers 
choose to work in the firm or not and then choose a level of effort hence 
of output and realise a profit. At the end of the first period, the owner 
observes profits and tries to infer managers ability in order to promote to 
the CEO position one of the high ability managers, at the beginning of 
the second period. Depending on the outcome of the signalling game, he 
may or may not be able to infer managers’ abilities. Since high ability 
managers have the best skills for the CEO position, the owner prefers pro­
moting one of them. However, in the case where he is unable to distinguish 
managers’ abilities, the owner promotes one of the N  managers at random 
to be CEO, since the CEO position must be filled in the second period3. 
Besides this, a new MBA is hired to run the vacant division. The game 
starts with a high ability manager at the CEO position.
Let Nh be the number of high ability managers (Nh <  N, common knowl­
edge). A manager learns his true type at the start of the game, although 
the owner remains uninformed. Ability is measured by an and aj, for 
high and low ability managers respectively, with an > an- The problem 
is that both types of managers can exert any effort levels e € [0, +oo[, 
so that the owner cannot infer ability by just observing output, which is 
given by x — e +  a. The divisional profit accruing to the owner is given by 
\A(x, a’r ) — w. where a*T is the effect of the CEO’s ability on divisional profit 
(his contribution to the firm’s performance), for T  =  H,L. Given their 
ability level, managers send the owner the signal x, and may choose any 
effort level so that cn +  an may be greater than en +  «// if ('i, > ?n ■ Low 
ability managers may find it profitable to exert a high effort level in the 
second period if this conveys the information that they have high ability 
and can be promoted. The owner's prior probability that a manager has 
high ability is p(a), a probability distribution over A =  {an,an}, which is 
common knowledge. The owner receives the signal x  and then takes action 
s £ {T.(promote), 0:(no promotion)}.
Therefore I focus on the firm and its internal labour market. Contracts are 
signed at the beginning of the first period, by which the owner commits to
3Implicit is the assumption that owners do not show any favouritism toward some 
managers, so that they just promote one of the N  managers at random. Similarly, man­




























































































a wage w\ for divisional managers and w2 for the CEO. Both wages are set 
so that the participation constraints hold, that is higher than managers' 
outside opportunity wage (otherwise no managers would turn up to work 
in the firm). Thus in this model incentives are provided by the prospects 
of higher salary that follows from promotion. However, the model can 
be easily extended to formalise non monetary rewards, by assuming that 
managers derive satisfaction from being promoted, by an increase in their 
utility independent of the wage increase.
The managers’ utility function is
U(w,e) =  g(w) -  (7(e),
where g{.) is continuous and strictly increasing in w, concave, reflecting 
managers risk aversion. C(.) is the disutility of effort, a continuous and 
strictly convex function, with the property that (7(0) =  0, C'(pc) =  0. 
It is assumed that divisional profits are independent, and cannot side- 
contract. This assumption is crucial in this model and is realistic since 
multi-divisional firms like General Motors have very autonomous regional 
divisions. Most models in the multi-agent literature make this assumption. 
Observed profits can be either high or low, depending on the manager’s 
effort. The owner’s promotion decision depends on his beliefs about the 
manager’s ability. Because he derives satisfaction from the wage increase, 
the manager wants to convey the information that he has high ability. The 
only indirect way for him to do so is to signal by exerting high effort hence 
generating high profit in the first period. The loss in first period utility 
may be offset by the second period gain in wage. High and low ability 
managers are assumed to have different utilities, UH =  g(w) — C H (e) and 
UL =  g(w) — <7L(e). It is assumed that C " (e) <  C L(e) for all e, because 
a higher ability makes it easier to exert effort, but C H(0) =  C L{0) =  0 
(single-crossing property). It could be assumed that the levels of effort 
that minimise cost are different for the two types. This would amount 
to consider non-monetary rewards, such as social norms (Okuno-Fujiwara 
and Postlewaite, 1991) by which managers derive a social prestige from 
working for a large company or being promoted, inducing them to always 
play a minimum effort level through a loyalty they have for the company.
A rational owner, knowing that it is in the manager’s interest to “lie” , i.e. 



























































































information that he has high ability, will not necessarily infer high ability 
from an observation of x rr. In turn, the manager knows that the owner 
may reason like this, and so on. Hence the only way to solve this game is 
to look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Strategies for both players are 
as follows. A pure strategy for the manager is a function x that gives his 
first period output as a function of his ability, his effort and his probability 
of promotion. A pure strategy for the owner is a function s that gives 
the owner’s decision (promote: 1 or not:0), as a function of the first period 
output of the manager. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is then a strategy 
pair (x*,s*), and conjecture (xc, sr) such that:
- x* maximises the manager’s payoff given his beliefs sc about the owner’s 
strategy.
- s* maximises the owner’s payoff given his beliefs xc about the manager’s 
strategy.
- (z*,s*) =  (xc,sc), i.e. beliefs are correct.
Managers are assumed to always maximise their lifetime utility. As they do 
not need to keep a reputation in the last period of the game, they always 
exert their cost-minimising level of effort in the second period, namely 
zero effort4. In this context we have two kinds of equilibria, separating 
and pooling equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, the high ability (H ) 
manager and the low ability (L) manager realise different output levels. 
The first period profit then fully reveals managers’ abilities to the owner, 
and the owner promotes one of the high type managers. In a pooling equi­
librium, a manager produces the same level of output whether he has high 
or low ability. The owner then learns nothing about the manager’s ability 
from observing first period profit and his posterior beliefs are identical to 
his prior ones. He then either promotes one of the N managers at random.
4 An overlapping generation model with infinite number of periods, rather than fi­
nite (two) periods like in this paper, would not have the assumption of zero effort for 
divisional managers in the last period. I work in the simple case of two periods because 
this simplifies exposition and makes the point of this paper. In addition, finite models 
with zero effort in last periods are generally considered in the literature (e.g. Vickers 





























































































Two conditions are necessary for a separating equilibrium to exist. Namely, 
the high ability manager must not want to pick the low ability manager’s 
output level, and vice versa. The owner then observes x*H — e.fj +  an 
and x*L =  ei +  a/,. Since the low type manager knows that he will not be 
promoted in a separating equilibrium, he has no incentive to expand effort, 
and therefore plays e i =  0. The high type plays en, the value of which will 
be determined by the conditions for equilibrium to exist. The owner then 
learns the managers’ ability and promotes one of the H type managers 
in the second period. This is the owner’s best response to x*, since he is 
sure to promote a H type manager. If the owner observes an output level 
different from x}f or x\ , he concludes that the manager concerned has low 
ability.
A separating equilibria is therefore defined by three conditions.
(i) Beliefs assign a unique vector of beliefs to each strategy profile;
(ii) managers play pure strategies that lead to a different action profile for 
each type;
(iii) beliefs are consistent with the managers strategies. An important 
property of the owners beliefs is that the owner assigns to each manager 
an identical probability of being high ability if managers play the same 
strategy.
Then one can derive the necessary conditions for existence of separating 
equilibria.
Lamrna 1: The necessary condition for a separating equilibrium to exist is:
U "(w2, 0 ) - U " ( uh.Q) Ur-(w2.U ) - U ,'(wl ,0)
U"(unA)) -  U »{w u c „ )  ~ UHwu 0) -  U H w^e,,) 1 ’
For simplicity assume payoffs are not discounted. The / /  type finds it 
optimal to exert e» in the first period if his payoff from doing so exceeds 




























































































U "{w , ,e „ )  +  - ^ U " ( u ’2.ü) +  (1 -  -L )U " (w u O) > 2U "(wt.O)
A il Nh
That is,
UH(w t,0 ) -U " (w ,,0 )
U»{wu ü ) -U " {w x.eH) “  "
In the second period, the H type manager expends en =  0 because he no 
longer needs to build reputation. The condition for the L type manager 
is,
UL{w i,eH +A a)+——— UL(w2, 0) + ( l - —:—-— )UL(wi, 0) <  2Ur'(w\,Q),
lvjl +  I JVf/ + 1
where
A a =  an — ai
because for x fr to be the same for both types of managers, the low type 
must realise
Xfj — a/, +  en -T an — a  ̂ +  (en +  Aa)
when the high type realises
xn — au +  en
Besides, since Nn is managers’ private knowledge, the deviating low type 
manager is included in the pool of candidates for promotion; the owner 
believes that there are (Nn +  1) high ability managers.
"  ~~ Ul'(w\,Q) — U,'(w\1en +  A  a)
The first inequality implies that Nn must not be too large for the II 
type managers to be willing to separate. Otherwise their probability of 




























































































Similarly, the second inequality shows that as long as his disutility of effort 
is larger than his gain in utility due to a wage increase, the low ability 
manager will always be willing to separate. The high ability manager may 
exert strictly positive effort in order to separate, depending on the cost of 
pooling for the low ability manager. Notice that if the cost of effort to the 
low ability manager is very high, then the high types do not even need to 
expand effort and can play e =  0 at the separating equilibrium: that case 
is equivalent to the full information case.
Notice also that the low ability managers play zero effort at a separating 
equilibrium whatever the owners system of beliefs. To see this, assume the 
low type exerts e' ^  0 at equilibrium. Then either he is still believed to be 
a low type and e =  0 is a dominating strategy, or he is believed to be low 
type with a probability p <  1, he is still not promoted but has a higher 
cost of effort (CL(0) =  0,C L(e) >  0), hence lower utility. Therefore, in 
either cases he chooses e =  0 which is the dominating strategy.
It is assumed that managers’ utility functions are separable and given by 
UT(w,e) =  g(w) — CT(e), T =  H,L. Therefore, condition (1) above can 
be written as:
C  (e»)  ^  --------
C L{e „ + A a )  > (yjwi) - f f(w i)) 
(Nh +  1)
Given that CH and C L are continuous and strictly increasing in e, with 
C u (e) < C L(e) for all e, the single-crossing property holds and there exist 
separating equilibria e// such that:
( c Ly g{w2) -  ff(mi) 
Nu +  1
A a < eu <  (C 'Y y{w2) -  gju’i) 
Nu ( 2)
On the other hand, if this condition is satisfied, low types managers will 
not play (‘u because their resulting payoff will be less than the payoff from 
exerting zero effort in both period. High type managers find it profitable 




























































































having some non zero probability of promotion. Hence condition (2) is 
also a sufficient condition; this leads to proposition 1.
Proposition 1: For utility functions additively separable, with continuous, 
strictly increasing effort cost functions, the single property holds and there­
fore there exist separating equilibria defined by inequality (2).
There is investment in reputation if the high ability managers exert at 
equilibrium an effort level higher than zero. The least-cost separating 
effort is higher than zero if
( c Lr i g(w2) - g { m )
Nh +  1
— A  a >  0
Therefore, for cost of effort functions such that
g{w2) -  g{w\)
Nf, +  1
> Aa
, there is investment in reputation due to the signalling activity. I consider 
that case.
The belief structure under which this equilibrium holds can be explicitly 
defined by three conditions.
(i) If all managers play x u such that (2) holds, owners believe all managers 
have high ability;
(ii) If one manager plays x# satisfying (2) while all other managers exert 
zero effort, then that manager is believed to be a high type and all other 
managers to be low types, unless they also play .
(iii) The owner believes any manager playing a strategy different from (i) 
and (ii) to be of low ability.
Given the structure of beliefs, if all high ability managers play the least-cost 
limit effort no one of them deviates to play a higher limit effort, because 
the owner will think that the deviating high ability manager is a low type.
A crucial assumption in this model is that a low type is much less efficient 
than a high type as a CEO. Therefore the owner earns much higher profits 
when the CEO is high ability than low ability, and it matters more to the 




























































































first period by the investment, in reputation. The effects of the incentive 
system on the owner’s profit are first, an increase in the first period due 
to higher effort exerted to signal ability, and second, a higher profit due to 
the CEO being high ability. Since the second effect is assumed larger than 
the second one, the assumed structure of beliefs make sense. Otherwise, it 
could be assumed that the owner promotes for sure any upward deviating 
manager. Then both types would have higher incentives in the first period 
to increase effort, but with the drawback that for certain cost of effort 
functions, the low types may exert the highest first-period effort, and be 
promoted as CEO. This is appropriate if the first effect is higher than the 
second one.
To illustrate these general results, I now consider a specific example. Let 
g(w) =  w ,C r'(e ) =  e and C L(e) =  2e, so that low ability managers find it 
more costly to expand effort. Condition (2) can be rewritten
(w2 - w 1} (w2— Aa < eu < W\)
2(N „ +  1) ”  -  " "  -  Nh (3)
which implies that Nn must not be too small for the low type manager to 
find more profitable to separate on en. (3) defines an interval for separating 
equilibria [eo,ei]5, such that
and
eo
(w2 -  Wi}
2 (N „ +  1)
— Aa (4)
e, =  (5)
Nil
Since the high ability managers exerts the least-cost separating effort at 
equilibrium, en =  eo at equilibrium. Besides this, high ability managers 
effort level is never zero at equilibrium unless the effort cost of low abil­
ity managers is so high that they cannot expand effort e =  an — afj. so 
that J'i =  Xu -- an. Consequently there exists a least-cost separating 
equilibrium (x), =  «// +  e0: :r) =  a;,). such that Co is given by (4).




























































































For given wages, the owner has no incentive to deviate from his separating 
equilibrium strategy, because his resulting payoff If., is larger than his full 
information payoff, due to managers’ overinvestment in reputation.
The owner’s profit in the separating equilibrium is as follows.
First-period payoffs:
Nn.ll(ei{ +  aii,a'lr) +  (N  — Nu)Yl(ai,, a),) — Nwi — w2
where the first term is the profit earned by the Nr/ divisions that are 
managed by high ability managers, the second term is the profit earned 
by the remaining divisions, which are managed by low ability managers, 
the third term is the wages paid to the divisional managers, and the final 
term is the wage of the CEO.
Second-period payoff:
7V„n(a„,a*„) +  (N  — — Nw\ — w2
The first term is the profit earned by the Nh divisions that are managed 
by high ability managers. Since their ability has been revealed by their 
actions in the first period, and since this is a two-period model, they have 
no incentive to exert extra effort in the second period. This is an unrealistic 
implication of the model that would not arise in an overlapping generations 
model. Recognising this, I choose to work with a two-period model for 
simplicity. The remaining terms in the second-period payoff are interpreted 
in the same way as the corresponding terms in the first-period payoff.
Adding, the overall objective function of the owner is
n., — N[iYl(en + (in , a*ii )+2 (N  — Nn)Yl(ai,, a ),) +  A'/; If (a //, a'n ) — 2 Nw\ — w 2
(G)
The owners posterior probability is p(aii) =  Nn/N. The full information 
payoff is where all managers play their cost-minimising effort level (zero) 
and the owner promotes one high ability manager for sure. The owner 
then obtains,





























































































n.s — n d — N„.n(er, + air.amn) — Nn.Tl(an,a'lf)
which is positive since effort is positively correlated with output, hence 
profit, and en > 0. This shows explicitly that the gain to the owner results 
exclusively from managers investment in reputation, and this establishes 
proposition 2, valid for a large class of parameters.
Proposition 2: For exogenous wages, the owner is better-off in the separat­
ing equilibrium relative to the full information equilibrium, thanks to the 
high ability managers ’ investment in reputation.
3.2.2 Pooling Equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium both types play the same level of output. One 
such equilibrium is one in which x'H =  x*r =  xp. High ability managers in 
this case do not find it profitable to expand effort in order to be separated, 
and they let low ability managers imitate them. Conditions for this to 
occur are given below. The owner’s best response is:
s'(x  /  xp) =  “no promotion”
s’ (x — xv) — “promote one manager at random”
Suppose the owner follows s', s* is a best response to x ' since the owner 
would not promote a manager realising an output different from xp who 
may be a low ability manager. The structure of beliefs supporting this 
equilibrium is the following.
(i) If all managers play the same output, the owner promotes one of them 
at random.
(ii) If one (or more) manager plays a different output from all other man­
agers, the owner believes he has low ability, unless he (they) play the 
separating output level. Is i* a utility-maximising response for managers 
? Formally, the condition for managers to find it optimal to follow this 
strategy is as follows.
Lemma 2: The necessary condition for pooling equilibiia to exist is




























































































Managers implicit incentive to increase effort is ep.
In the pooling equilibrium, high and low ability managers realise the same 
output level but they exert different effort levels:
xp — epii +  aw — epr, +  aj,
So that
epL =  ePH +  (o-h ~  aL)
The low type manager finds it optimal to mimic his high type counterpart 
in the first period if his payoff from doing so is higher than his payoff from 
deviating, given that all other managers pool on xp. The condition is,
UL(wu ePL) +  ~ U l{w2, 0) +  (1 -  jj)UL{rm, 0) > 2UL(wu 0)
That is, given the additive separability assumptions for the utility function,
U'ffw2, 0 ) - U L(wu 0)
~ UL{wu 0) -  UL(w\,ePi)
C - M  <  (9)
Deviation means exerting zero effort level in both period. The reason is 
that the assumed out-of-equilibrium beliefs are that the owner thinks that 
any manager playing an effort level different from the equilibrium level are 
likely to be low types. Again the above inequality shows that managers 
exert an effort higher than zero, thereby pooling, only if the gain from 
doing so is higher than its cost.
Similarly, the H manager follows the equilibrium strategy if and only if
U"(wu ePH) + ^ U "(w 2,0) + (1 -  >  2U" (w\, 0)
That is,
U "(w2, 0 ) - U " ( w ,M)





























































































r,U,. i))c  (epU) <  ---------- —-------- (10)
Since epu < epi and C r'(e) > C u (e) for all e, (7) implies (8). Hence 
lemma 2.
Since the single-crossing condition holds, pooling equilibria do exist. The 
interval of pooling effort levels is then defined by e such that (9) holds. 
This is e G [ap — a/,,e2],with
e2 =  (C L)~1
g(w2) -  g(wi)
N ( 11)
The least-cost pooling effort for high ability manager is zero, hence xp =  
a//, implying an effort level of (ap — ap) for low ability managers. In 
addition if all managers pool on xp such that condition (9) holds, then no 
manager deviates because he would get a lower utility. Hence proposition 
3.
Proposition 3: The interval for pooling equilibria is given by epp and ePf, 
such that
ep = ePp + (ap -  aL) 
ep € [ap — ai , 62],
with
e2 =  (c<fr
g(w2) -  g(w 1 ) 
N
The low ability manager invests in reputation in that equilibrium.
Pooling and separating equilibria should now be compared, in order to 
check the coherence of the results. eP is given by (9), and ep by (2). Since 
the effort cost functions are continuous and strictly increasing, so are their 
inverse functions. In addition, for N  > Np +  1,
g('»'2) -  g(w 1 ) g{w2) -  g(wx)
Np + 1 -  N
Consequently, the minimum possible separating effort is higher than the 




























































































equilibria do not intersect.6 For given effort costs, the higher the proportion 
of high ability managers in the firm, the more pooling is likely since the 
probability of promotion of high ability managers is low anyhow. The 
lower the number of divisions, and the lower the cost of effort for the low 
ability manager, the more likely is a pooling equilibrium to arise.
The owner’s profit in the least-cost pooling equilibrium is as follows.
The first-period payoff is
NU(aH,a"H) -  w2 -  Nw,
where all divisional managers realise output xp = an- 
The second-period payoff is
Nn
~jy~ [N //.n(af/,a jj) +  (N — 7VH)Il(a/y,aj/)] +
N ~n N"  [N „.n (a „,a D  +  (N — N „)Il(aL,a'L)} -  w2 -  Nw,
where the first term is the payoff got from promoting a high ability man­
ager, time the probability of choosing a high ability manager, the second 
term is the profit obtained when promoting a low ability manager, times 
the probability of choosing such a CEO. The last terms are the wages given 
to managers in the second-period.
Adding, the pooling equilibrium payoff to the owner is
lip =  N.U(an,a)l ) — 2w 2 — 2Nw, +  (12)
~  [fV„.n(a„,a*„) +  ( N -  Nn)U(a,„« ) ,) ]  +
IV
N ~n N"  [N „.n (a „,a ;.) +  (N  -  w „ )n K ,a * ) ]
The payoff to the owner is increased in the first period, relative to the 
case of known ability, because the L manager exerts higher effort; however 
in the second period the expected payoff to the owner is reduced because




























































































he may promote a low ability manager, who realises a low output in the 
second period. His posterior x is l/N. equal to his prior probability.
In order to compare this with the separating equilibrium, one has to com­
pute
n« — np =  Nh .Yl(en + an, a*u) + 2(N — Nn)ïl(a,i, aH) N / {  ,T[(an, a,//)
^  [AT„.n(aw,a-„) +  ( N -  N „)U (aL, a*„)] -  
N ~j~ ~  [Nh -n (a „ ,a L) +  ( N -  N „)U (aL, a£)]
One can rewrite this
N„.n(e„ +  an, a),) — N.U(an,an) +
N -  Nu
N —  [(2JV -  7VH).n(at ,a*ff) -  (N  -  JVw)n(at , a*J] + 
Nh N ~n N"  [n(aw,a*H) -  n (aw,a*J]
Hence the payoff in the separating equilibrium is higher than in that in 
the pooling equilibrium if
Nn.U(en + a ff,o*„) +  N J * ?  [(2iV -  N„).n(aL,a'H) -  (N -  Nn)n(aL,a'L)} 
Nn N ~n N"  [n (a„, a*„) -  n (oH, al)} > iV.n(a„,a*„)
I assume that n (.,a^ ) —n(. X )  > n (a f/,.) —n(at, .),so that the difference 
in profit due to different CEO ability is higher than or equal to the differ­
ence in profit due to the different ability of the divisional manager. This 
implies for the owner the importance in promoting a high ability manager 
as CEO. Then the above inequality is equivalent to
Nn.U(en+an,a*n)+(N—Nn) [n(a/,,a*„) -  n(a„,a*J] > N [n (a /,X ,)  -  n (a f,,a




























































































(N -  Nh ) [n (a „,a '„) -  n(a„,a*J] > (N -  N „) [n(a„,a*„) -  n (a f„a*„)]
Besides this,
Nf{ U.(eu +  a,H,a*H) >  N n  [n(a//, a#) — n(a£,,aj/)]
Adding the latter two inequalities, one obtains
Ids > lip
Hence proposition 4.
Proposition The owner is better-off in a separating equilibrium than in 
a pooling equilibrium.
4 Screening Model in the Monopoly
4.1 Wage endogenisation in the monopoly
Consider a fixed number of divisions. The owner can then set first and 
second period wages to induce a separating equilibrium. The owners max­
imisation problem is then, for Wi £ wm], i =  1,2 (wm is the maximum 
wage that the owner could possibly pay)7:
MaxWUW2Us =  NH .U(eri+nn, a,„ )+ 2 (N -N n )U (a L, a*H)+Nn ,U(an , a 'i^^N w i-
(13)
subject to
(a) C t (e//) y{wi) - g { w i)
N „  +  1
(14)
(b) wi >  w0
7The owner cannot set a wage lower than w0, because managers would never choose 




























































































Since managers minimise effort, they will separate on the least-cost sepa­
rating effort, hence (a). Since C ,J is convex and continuous, {C L)~X exists 
and has continuous first and second derivatives . Also Ifs has continuous 
first and second derivatives. 14(a) implies
den =  g'(wi) ,CLyV ( ~ 9(w i)\ 
dw\ Nh +  V  J \ Nh +  1 J
den _  g'{w2) L. p f g(w2) -  g (w i)\
dw2 Nh +  V  ’ \ Nh +  1 J
The Lagrangian of the above maximisation problem is (12)
L — Nnll{eH +a,H) VH)+ 2(N —Nn)^l(a[y,a ^ + N n ^ a n , aH)~^Nwi—2w2+X (w i-
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
dL








dl\{eH +  o-h , ci'h) den - 2  =  0
d\
den dw2 
w\ — wo >  0; X(w\ — wq); A >  0
Equation 15(a) implies
dn(en +  an, a"n) den
\ = - N h -
deH dw \
-  2AT + A =  0 +  2JV
Since < 0, A > 0, the constraint is binding and W\ = w0. The first 
period wage is determined on the external managerial labour market, where 
divisional managers are hired in the first period.
A can be interpreted as the marginal loss in profit due to the lower incentive 
to expand effort. Since this is positive, the owner sets the first period wage 
at the lowest possible level, namely wo-




























































































(16)dn(en + an, ah) den 
Nh d^r d^2
Since Ils is a composition of functions g(.), (C L)~\ n(.),, which are con­
tinuous and differentiable in R+, Ils is also continuous and differentiable 
on [u;o,mm], a compact set. By the Weierstrass theorem, (b) has solutions. 
For this solution to be a maximum, the second order condition must be 
negative.
I assume the second order condition is met8. This leads to the following 
result.
Proposition 5: The wage contract (w\ , w2), where
w i =  w0
and w2 is solution to
dU(el{ + Q / / ,  a'H) den _  2 .
den dw2 Nn
induces a separating equilibrium.
To illustrate this result, consider the example where g(w) =  w and C L(e) — 
2e. Profit is specified as follows. Managers activity is aimed at minimising 
divisional marginal costs, so that the latter are given by c =  0 — a — e. Each 
division faces identical demand, which is given by p =  A — q, where q is 
the quantity produced in each division. Then managers set simultaneously 
effort and quantity produced to maximise each divisions gross profit II (x), 
with 11(e) =  (A — 0 +  a +  e)2/4, where a is the ability of the CEO to 
coordinate the firms activities. U.(en +  an. a j,) is then given by
II(e// +  an, a),) {A — /3 + an + a"n + en)2 4
Therefore (17) can be solved for w2
8Alternatively, Hestenes (quoted by Takayama, 1990), shows that:
- If there exists solutions to the optimisation problem,
- The rank of ~  1 is e<tual to 2’




























































































w2 =  wn +  2 (Nn +  1) 8 {N/i +  1)
N „
— (A — (3 + (if/ + a),)
A numerical example is A — 10, 0 =  5, an =  2, aj, =  1, and Nn =  5 out 
of 10 divisions. Then
W2 =  Wq +  19.2
which is quite a substantial wage increase necessary to make high ability 
managers investment in reputation worthwhile. The separating equilib­
rium limit effort is then en — 1.6.
Corollary 1: For g(w) =  w and C L(e) =  2e,the wage contract (w ^w j) 
where
Wi =  w 0
W2 — Wo +  2(Nn + 1) 8 (N „ +  1) 
N „
— (A — 0 +  an + a*H)
induces high ability managers to separate on the limit effort
en
8 (N „ +  1) 
N„
(A — 0 + an +  a*H)
In order to see how will u)2 respond to an exogenous change in some of 
the parameters, I carry out some comparative statics. These will ascertain 
how u>2 would have differed from what it is in this equilibrium had the 
parameters been slightly different.
The first-order condition on W2 is








































































































+  1 + n, d2en dw2 dwl dan =  0
dw 2 
dan
n n ( ^ ) 2 + n, d2e„ = -n„ def,
dw^
(19)
k dw2 ’  d w \
The term in bracket is negative by the sign of the second order condition 
for profit maximisation,
and the RHS is negative, which results in
dw2
dan
>  0 ( 20)
This means that the second period wage increases with the ability of the 
high types. The owner finds it more profitable to induce a separating 
equilibrium for greater ability level of the high types.
Now, take the derivative of (16) with respect to Nn- This is
du)2




Since the term in square brackets is negative,
dw 2
m , >  0 (22)
The interpretation is that the more numerous the high ability managers, 
the lower the probability of promotion for each of them. Hence at the 
separating equilibrium the second period wage has to be higher to induce 
the same limit effort.
4.2 Alternative incentive contract
In the case where owners were not concerned about choosing a CEO among 
divisional managers, this section analyses whether the owner would be 



























































































the wage increase to all managers revealing high type. Then in a separating 
equilibrium, managers revealing high type will be promoted for sure. This 
raises the likeliness of a separating equilibrium, as shown in the following 
lemma.
The condition for the high ability managers to separate on a limit effort 
en in this case is
UH (u>!, e2H ) + UH {w2,0) > 2U" (tui, 0) 
That is, given the assumption of additively separable utility,
C H(e2„ )  <  9{w i ) -g {w x)
For the low ability manager,
UL(wi,e'2H +  A a) +  UL(w2,0) <  2UL(wl ,0)
That is,
(23)
C L{e2H +  Aa) > g(w2) -  g{wx) (24)
Hence lemma 3.
Lemma 3: In the case where all managers revealing high ability are given 
a wage increase, separating equilibria are defined by conditions (23) and 
(24).
In addition, since the assumption about utility functions are the same as in 
the previous sections, the conditions for existence of separating equilibria 
are verified, leading to the following proposition.
Proposition 6: There exists a least-cost separating equilibrium (x), =  x) =  
0), such that
eo =  (C L) 1 [g(m) ~  g{m)} -  a  a




























































































Now I need to compute the wage contract(s) enforcing a separating equi­
librium, and then compare the owners equilibrium profit in both cases of 
promotion of one or all high ability managers.
The owner’s payoff when he gives the wage increase to all high ability 
managers is fls2 such that
ns2 =  Nj i -{- a,f[, a*fi) +  2(N — Nfj)Yl(a,L, ar{) Nfi.Yl(a,fi, alfatyb)
— (2N +  1 — Nh )w\ -  (Nfl -I- l)w2
The owner sets w\ and u>2 to maximise fls2 subject to the constraints
(a) CL(e2H) =  j H - j H )
(b) wi > w0
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L — N[iYl(e2H +  +  2(N — Nfj)U(a[J,a''l,) +  NnYl(an,a"H)
- ( 2 N  +  1 -  Nh)wi -  (Nh +  l)w2 +  n(w\ -  w0)
Kuhn Tucker conditions are
[a) p -  =  NHdU{eo +  ^ - QV )| i  _  (2N +  1 -  N„) + fi =(26)
dwi oe g ow\
„ s d L  Ar an {el +  a„,a*H)del , AT , ^ n
(b) - —  =  Nh ---------- —2--------- j ------- (A „ +  1 ) =U
ow2 oe o OVI-2
(c)§£ =  u>i — wo >  0; n(w\ — w0);/J > 0
This problem is solved in the same way as in the previous section, leading 
to the solution
w i =  w0




























































































(27)édf (c2 +  n u , a"n) de l _  iV» +  1 del dw-2 N/i
Let owners’ profit be Ids1 and second period wage w\ in the case in which 
they promote one manager, Ils2 and wf when they reward all managers 
revealing high type. These can be computed as
Ü S 1 =  NnYl(en + + 2(N — Nn)H(a[y,a]i) + NnYl(an,a*f{)
—2Nw\ — 2 w 2
Ids2 =  NnTl(el +  an .a],) +  2(N — Nn)U(aL, a'n) +  Nnïl(an ■,0,‘n) 
- (2 N +  1 -  N„)wi -  (NH +  1 )re2
This yields
Lis2 — Ids1 =  Nu [n(e2 +an,a,n) — Id(ef/ +af/,aj/)j — (NH +  l)w2 — 2w\ 
+ (N „ -  1 )wq
Therefore if w\ and w\ are such that
Nn [n(e2 + an, a),) — Id(e// + an, a)/)] >  (Nn +  l)(u>2 — u>o) — 2(w\ — Wq)
It is more profitable for the owner to reward one high ability manager.
As an example, if </(w) =  w, C L{e) =  2e, C "(e ) -  e, the equilibrium wage 
contract and implied limit effort in the case of one promotion are given by 
Corollary 1. The wage contract inducing a separating equilibrium in the 
case in which the owner rewards all managers revealing high ability is,
u>2 — a; n + 2 --------2(A — 3 + an +  u)/)
N n




























































































(A — ft +  an +  g'h )N// +  1 
N,i
Hence
ns2 -  ns1 = -4 {N rl +  1)
J N „  + \)
Nr,
— (A — {1 +  an +  ah) < 0
Therefore the owner finds it more profitable to promote one high ability 
manager only. The reason for this is that the gain to the owner from man­
agers investment in reputation is offset by the increase in the wage cost 
resulting from the scheme which promotes all managers signalling high 
ability.
Proposition 7: For g(w) =  w, C ,J(e) =  2e, C H (e) =  e, it is more prof­
itable for the owner to promote only one manager rather than offer a wage 
increase to all managers that reveal high ability.
5 Model in a Duopoly
The duopoly has two firms, each with N divisions, hence N managers. 
Each manager competes in a Cournot duopoly with the manager heading 
a similar division in the rival firm. Strategic considerations affect the 
contracts offered to managers. The two firms are denoted by i =  1,2. 
Their cost functions are negatively correlated with effort, and demand is 
given exogenously, as in the previous section. The signalling game is the 
same as in section II. Since both firms are symmetric and face the same- 
demand and technology conditions, Bayesian updating should lead to the 
same conclusion. Hence I assume that both owners form the same beliefs 
as to managers’ types after observing managers’ actions9.
Once again two types of equilibria, pooling and separating, arise. It is 
assumed that divisional managers cannot change firm during the two pe­
riods considered (the contract they sign at the beginning of the first pe­
riod stipulates that they work for at least two periods in the same firm).





























































































Since duopolists are assumed symmetric, equilibria are the same as in 
the monopoly case. Hence only separating equilibria are envisaged below. 
What differ in the duopoly are the equilibrium wage contracts.
5.1 Wage determination
Consider the condition for separating equilibria. The high ability managers 
in each firm find it optimal to exert limit effort en in the first period if 
their payoff from doing so exceeds the payoff from deviating,
UH(wu eH)+ y U H(w2, 0) +  (1 -  y)UH(wu 0) > 2UH(wu 0)
That is,
U "(w 2,0 ) - U " ( w u 0)
UH(wu 0) -  UH(wu eH) ~ H
In the second period, the H type manager expends en =  0 because he no 
longer needs to build reputation. The condition for the L type manager 
is,
UL(wu eH +  Aa) + y U L{w2,0) +  (1 -  y)UL{wu 0) < 2UL{wu 0)
or
UL(w 2 ,0 )-U L(wu 0)
H ~ UL(wi, 0) — UL(w\,eH +  A  a)
Therefore as in section 3, The least-cost separating equilibrium is
C L(eH)
g{w2) -  g{wi)
Nh +  1
— Aa
Owners can then set w2 to force a separating equilibrium. In the duopoly, 
the resulting higher effort will shift the firm’s reaction function and increase 
output and profit at equilibrium at the expense of the rival firm. Assume 
again that managers activities aim at reducing the firms marginal costs10,




























































































so that as x increases, the marginal cost of the firm reduces. Also assume 
both firms in each duopoly face the same demand and technology. Demand 
is linear and given by p — A — qx — r/2. while costs are given by c(qi) =  
(/3—Xi)qi~W, where W  is a vector of wages paid to managers, and i =  1,2.
Then the duopoly equilibrium is at the crossing point of reaction functions, 
which are computed as
A - P  +  X i- q ,  . . . .
Qi = ------------- a------------~ 'A ,J  =  1 , 2 (28)
where Xi, i =  1,2, are the divisional output in each firm, such that
%i — O’H A Q-f] +  Cj
a‘n is the CEO’s contribution to the divisional profits, assumed the same 
in the two firms (for simplicity). Then the profit in each division is the 
usual Cournot duopoly profit,
_  (A — (3 +  2xi — x j )2
n, -  i ------—  (29)
for i, j  =  1, 2, i /  j. This shows that divisional profits depend on the 
limit effort exerted in the competing division of the rival firm.
In firm 1, the owner’s payoff in a separating equilibrium is
nsi =  NnUieniwl) +  af, ,a „ ,e j r(wl)) (30)
+2(JV— NH)n(ar„a'H,e „(w l))  (31)
Nubian,a*,,,eH(wl)) -  2w\ -  2Nw\
where
• w\ is the first period wage in firm 1;
• w\ the second period wage in firm 1;




























































































• Cji(w\),i =  1, 2, the limit, effort of high ability managers as a function 
of the second period wage in each firm 1 and 2.
The owner of firm 1 therefore set wages to maximise ILsi subject to the 
participation constraint. The Lagrangian can be written as
L =  NHYl(eH{wl) +  a „ ,a „ ,e H(wl)) 
+2(N  — Ar//)n (a t, au ,en(w\)) 
Nt,U{aH,a'H,en{w l)) -  2w\ -  2Nw\ 
+7(ie1 -  w0)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
OL Ar dU(en(wl) +  an,a*H,eu(w\)) ,




dU(a„{w\) + a „ ,a ,„ ,e i ,{w l) )e H(w\) 
defi(wl) dw\
dïï(e„{w\) + a „,a '‘ll,e rl{wl)) dw\ 
dw\ dw\
ôlf(a/y, amH-, en{u>l)) dw\
+ N „
+2(N  -  Nn)
dwl dw\




=  Wi -  Wo >  0; 7 (wi -  Wo); 7  >  0
Equation (32) implies that
d n (c„{w\) +  a „.a ),,e„{w \ ))  , oAr7 =  -  A //.------------------— ;--------------------- 1- ziv
Uw\
Since

































































































Therefore the constraint is binding and
w\ =  w„
7 >  0
By symmetry,
w\ =  w0
Equation (33) then gives a reaction function in wages, w\(w\) , that will 





\  t \ 0 n  (aL ,a*„,eH(w%)) AT S n ( a H ,a * ,,e /,( t id ) )
N" ) ------a£s—  +  N" -------SS?------
2 -  N „










if and only if,




Nn +  1






























































































N„ +  1
< 1
■WI-XC*)- < ,
Therefore (35) holds and the slope of the reaction function in the wage 
space is negative.
Proposition 8: There exists a wage contract (w\ , w-i ) such that
Wi =  w0
W2 is given by (33).
that induces a separating equilibrium, in which high ability managers exert 
limit effort. In the duopoly, strategic interactions imply that wages set in 
one firm depend (negatively) on the wages set in the rival firm.
If the owner in one firm increases the second period wage, limit effort by its 
high ability managers increases, implying a rise in their divisional output 
hence a shift of their reaction functions to the right, and an increase in 
profit at the expense of the rival in the divisional duopoly. * This result is 
as expected, and leads to an endogenisation of the objective and incentive 
function in the model of Vickers (1985), also considered in Feshtmann and 
Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and others.
5.2 Endogenisation of the profit and sales maximisa­
tion objective
Vickers analyses a duopoly with one manager-owned firm and one firm 
where management is separated from control. In the latter firm, the owner 
sets an incentive scheme which is a linear combination of profits and sales. 
Hence managers are asked to maximise <j)U +  (1 — 4>)R, where R =  pq is the 
revenue from sales. Vickers show that setting <f> <  1 actually leads the firm 




























































































is that this incentive scheme amounts to inducing managers to reduce 
marginal cost by <j>u :
(j)U +  (1 -  0)R  =  (p -  <t>c)q
where c is the marginal cost. Thus a firm which does not maximise directly 
profit ends up earning larger profit than a firm which directly aims at 
maximum profit. However. Vickers avoids issues of wage determination 
and does not analyse precisely the asymmetry of information between the 
manager and the owner.
Now let the owner of one firm in the duopoly increase the promised second 
period wage. This induces high ability managers at a separating equilib­
rium to raise the limit effort they exert, with, writing A for variations, 
Ae =  /\g('W2)/{Nu +  1), producing a shift of firm l ’s reaction function to 
the right. Reaction functions are indeed given by (28), and the increase in 
the wage induces q\ to increase by 2Ae/3, while q2 reduces by Ae/3. The 
incentive 0 that would produce the same shift of firm Is reaction function 
is just (j)Ci =  dx, where C\ is firm l ’s cost before the wage increase, and r\ 
the cost after the wage increase. Therefore
c ^ J  aH a „ {C )
Cl ft - a H -  ah -  (C 'O -1 [r t f c f f 0 ]
(f> < 1 because w'2 > w2, and the objective function assumed by Vickers is 
endogenised. The owner setting an incentive scheme based on wages and 
promotion induces his managers not to maximise profit, but this turns out 
to be profitable. <f) is higher, the higher the effect of the wage increase on 
limit effort, the latter effect increasing with managers willingness to build 
reputation, i.e. with the extent of managers implicit incentives. Hence 
the empirical evidence on regular wage increases given to divisional man­
agers and CEOs can be interpreted as a mean for the owner to induce 
cost-minimising activities, which increases the firms profit at the expense 1
11 In the model of Vickers (1985), managers’ objective function is O =  [p -  c + ojq, so 
that the incentive enters the function additively rather than multiplicatively, as in the 
function I consider. The effect of the incentive on managers’ cost reducing activities in 






























































































This model shows that signalling aspects of implicit incentives induce man­
agers to exert effort above their cost of effort-minimising level in order to 
build a reputation and therefore have a higher probability of promotion. 
This confirms the observation in reality that top executives do sometimes 
work very hard in order to climb the hierarchical ladder. This is especially 
the case for Japanese managers. Also, this result accords with the findings 
in signalling games12 that overinvestment tends to occur in all equilibria. 
Here managers exert higher effort levels than in the full information case 
in both separating and pooling equilibria, high managers in the former and 
low ability ones in the latter. The model of this paper can therefore be 
seen as a reinterpretation of the familiar Spence signalling model to the 
context of internal labour markets and promotion.
It has been shown that in both cases of a single firm and a duopoly, delega­
tion and asymmetric information is actually profitable to the owner. This 
is due to the promotion system implying the need for managers to signal 
their ability, in order to have some chance of promotion. Since higher ef­
fort is assumed to produce higher output, the divisional profit of the owner 
increases as a result of this signalling activity. Limit effort in the separat­
ing equilibrium even unambiguously makes the owner better-off, earning a 
higher profit.
Moreover, this model provides insights as to the need to consider features 
of firms’ internal organisation to account for the relative performance of 
firms in oligopoly models, rather than focusing exclusively on parameters 
representing demand and rivals’ behaviour. Thus it is shown that a firm (or 
its owner) can induce an increase in its divisional output and profit at the 
expense of the rival in the divisional duopoly, by increasing the return to 
managers’ investment in reputation (by raising the second-period wage). 
The strategic advantage of delegation in oligopolies outlined by Vickers 





























































































Further research is as follows. First, the assumption that divisional profits 
are independent may he questionable. The case of correlation of some 
divisions’ outcomes should be further investigated. Second, uncertainty 
as to demand or cost parameters may be worth studying. A high effort 
may lead to low profits because of events beyond managers’ control, such 
as an unexpected slump or strike. Lastly, beliefs structures different from 
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